Mathematical Ethics Essay -- Math Philosophy Aristotle Papers

numerical Ethics Philosophers since antiquity restrain argued the merits of mathematics as a normative aid in respectable decision-making and of the mathematization of moral philosophy a theoretical discipline. Recently, Anagnostopoulos, Annas, Broadie and Hutchinson feel probed such issues said to be of interest to Aristotle. Despite their studies, the sense in which Aristotle either opposed or proposed a mathematical ethics in subject-matter and method remains unclear. This paper attempts to clarify the matter. It shows Aristotles matrix of exactitude and inexactness for ethical subject-matter and ethical method in the Nicomachean Ethics. Then it probes a resultant puzzle from the matrix, namely, the HL model of the happy life without context of mathematical justice (Bk. III) and the HJL model of the happy life with such rumination (Bk. V). Finally, it examines Aristotles twofold rationale for differentiating these two models in his overall example feedback loop system diff erences in the intellectual virtue of good deliberateness the priority of friendship over justice for the happy life. This suggests Aristotle saw no objection either to using mathematics as an aid to ethical decision-making for a happy life, or to mathematizing at least some separate of an ethical theory of eudaimonism. I. The problem of math ethics in contemporaneity and antiquity Mathematizing ethics to become scientific ethics has long been a dream of some philosophers, dating to both the Academy and perhaps the Lyceum. In modern philosophy Jeremy Bentham, (1) G.E. Moore, (2) and Nicholas Rescher (3) have tried to mathematize ethics. Such mathematizations square with Quines emplacement that mathematizing inexact things by way of exact methods marks a productive reduc... ...participants. It misses the mark methodologically, or, as Broadie likens it, it is playing at ethics or eventide a perversion. It is, as Aristotle sees in the Nicomachean Ethics, a deception, since the und erlying longitudinal presumption is that someone thinks they can become good by talking nearly the good without doing good and without being impacted by doing what they have chosen in a moral feedback loop system. (1105b 13-17) Furthermore, such maturation theories reign the iterative dimension of moral decision-making with feedback loops and filters in the development of moral computer address including the possible use of mathematical ethics in the manner of Aristotle, who seems to have steered a middle course between complete reductive mathematization of ethics and an apriori resistance to even a partial mathematization of ethics. Not too a good deal and not too little